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Abstract
We study the dynamics of co-evolution of producers and customers
described by bit-strings representing individual traits. Individual ”size-
like” properties are controlled by binary encounters which outcome
depends upon a recognition process. Depending upon the parameter
set-up, mutual selection of producers and customers results in different
types of attractors, either an exclusive niches regime or a competition
regime.
PACS: 89.65.-s Social and economic systems
∗Laboratoire associe´ au CNRS (UMR 8550), a` l’ENS et aux Universite´s Paris 6 et Paris
7
1
1 Introduction: hikers of the hyper-
cube
The study of dynamical systems most often concerns systems with few
degrees of freedom, or spatial systems. Physicists are less concerned
with other high dimensional systems. But many models in biology and
the social sciences are based on bit strings of often large dimensions.
If we take the case of biology and especially genomics, the genome
or the succession of monomers in biopolymers, is often represented by
a bit string. This is e.g. the case for models of the origin of life [1],
immunology [2], and of co-evolution [3].
These models are generally based on the following functional scheme:
Genome =⇒ recognition =⇒ action =⇒ results =⇒ population change.
The ”genome” described by a bit string undergoes selective en-
counters with other genomes and some action with more or less suc-
cessful results influences a death and/or ”birth” process.
These models also inspired social sciences: Cultural and opinion
dynamics have been described by [4, 5]. The minority game [6] applies
to finance. Finally the genetic algorithm approach [7] has a wide range
of applications ranging from co-evolution to optimisation.
All these algorithms have in common the bit-string description and
most often a recognition process, but they differ by the consequences
of significant encounters, as stressed by the well known title in psy-
chology: ”What do you do after your say Hello?”[8] .
The present model is built along the above lines. Let us consider a
set of consumers possibly interested in different products which char-
acteristics are described by bit strings. In the case of a car these
characteristics could be comfort, speed, size, gas consumption etc.
We here simplify by considering binary, independent characteristics.
The preferences of consumers i depend upon the overlap of their
own ideal string, their need string Si, with the product set of charac-
teristics Sj :
qij =
∑k
l=1 S
l
i.EQ.S
l
j (1)
Where the symbol EQ stands for the logical equivalence relation,
which gives 1 if the two bits are equal and 0 otherwise. The recog-
nition condition is that the overlap is larger than a fixed threshold.
Encounters and generated profits (or losses) influence an integrated
continuous variable which control the survival of the agents. Our
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model, to be completely defined in the next section, then defines a
co-evolution dynamics of consumers and producers.
We are interested in the dynamics of population of agents on the
hypercube and in the stable patterns that may arise. We want to
know how these patterns depend upon the parameters of the model:
what are the different regimes, where are their transitions.
The model is based on a consumers/producers co-evolution (as in
[9]) but it can also be applied to other domains. In political science
for instance, one could model the co-evolution of political parties plat-
forms and voters choices as described by bit strings; each bit is now
the position of the party (or the voter) on some specific issue, Europe,
retirement policy, environment etc.
Other applications can be very concrete. A major car construc-
tor can in principle provide a lot of options: their combination would
correspond to more than ten thousands different cars. But not all
combinations would sell well; furthermore each change on the produc-
tion chain has a cost. The issue for the producers is which combination
of options should I propose to the public in view of its distribution of
preferences. The same issue is faced by the local dealer: which stock
of combinations should I keep available to the local public?
2 The Model
In the model there are Np producer agents and Nc consumer agents.
Each consumer prefers a product which characteristics are coded by a
”need” string of k bits. Each producer manufactures a single product
which characteristics are also coded by a product string of k bits. The
bit string of a consumer represents what the consumer agent needs
and the bit string of a producer is a code for the product that he is
able to supply.
In addition to the two bit strings that code for needs and products,
the ”wealth” of each agent is defined by a scalar variable S or C,
depending upon the agent type (consumer or producer, respectively).
The variable Si represents the degree of satisfaction of the consumer
i and Cj represents the capital accumulated by producer j.
In economy this role is played by money, but in other contexts it
could be power or status.
The dynamics of the model is described by:
A recognition and transaction process.
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At each time step, all consumers look for the producer which prod-
uct is closest to their need (the product string with the largest overlap
qij; in the case of equality among several producers a random choice is
made among them). If the relative overlap
qij
k
between the producer
and the consumer strings is larger than a threshold θ, a transaction
occurs and the consumer satisfaction is changed according to:
Si(t+ 1) = Si(t)− ac +
qij
k
(2)
Satisfaction is increased according the relative overlap of the need and
product strings. It is decreased by a constant cost per transaction ac.
The equivalent updating of the producers capital is:
Cj(t+ 1) = Cj(t)− ap +
∑
i(j)
qij
k (3)
Capital is increased by the set of transactions in which producer j was
involved during the time interval, according the relative overlaps of the
need and product strings. The index i(j) runs over all the consumers
i that were supplied by producer j. Capital is decreased by a constant
production cost ap.
A death and renewal process.
There is no upper limit to consumer satisfaction or to producer
capital. But due to the costs terms, they may decrease to zero.
A producer which capital would become negative is destroyed and
not renewed.
On the opposite, a consumer which satisfaction would become neg-
ative disappears and is replaced by a new consumer, with a constant
initial satisfaction S0 and a randomly generated need string.
3 Checking the parameter space
In principle there are eight independent parameters:
• The string length k and the threshold θ for interaction.
• The consumption constants ap and ac.
• The initial numbers of producers (Np) and consumers (Nc).
• The initial endowments of producers (Cp) and consumers (Sc).
In practice, because of the irreversibily of the producers death
process, Cp and Np influence mostly the early stages of the dynamics.
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In terms of dynamical regimes and transitions, we might expect
that the most important parameters are ac and θ ( since we keep k
constant).
In equation 1, the positive term θ
k
is between 0 and 1. Then, for
large values of ac, ac larger than 1, the change in consumer satisfaction
is negative: the dynamics is characterised by a renewal process of
consumers. Consumers are created with S = Sc, and their satisfaction
can only linearly decrease to zero when they die. On average their
satisfaction is S = Sc/2. ac = 1 is then the critical value of the
satisfaction parameter separating the regime where some consumers
may increase their satisfaction with time and survive, from a renewal
regime when all consumers are condemned to a rapid death.
The threshold for interaction θ fixes a basin of satisfaction in the
neighborhood of the producer, which size is given by the number of
sites ns(θ) which Hamming distance to its product string is less or
equal to k−θ. Any consumer which string is in the basin of satisfaction
of a producer may interact with her. For k = 10, θ = 1 gives a
neighbourhood of size 1, size 11 for θ = 0.9, size 56 for θ = 0.8
etc. Comparing ns(θ) × Np to 2
k = 1024, the number of sites on
the hypercube, gives an approximation of the condition in threshold
separating the competition regime at low θ values, from the ”niche”
regime. In the competition regime, customers may choose between
different producers in their neighborhood; producers then competes
for customers. In the niche regime, they are so far apart that they
don’t compete.
In the competition regime, according to ap values, we might predict
that competition will reduce a too large initial number of producers by
bankruptcy, until they get closer to the critical number where the niche
regime is established. But according to initial conditions, essentially
Cp andNp, the selection of surviving producers may end up in a variety
of attractors as shown by simulations. Anyway, a maximum number
of surviving producers in the competition regime can be estimated
from equation 3. At equilibrium:
ap =
Nc
Np
<qij>
k
Np =
Nc
ap
<qij>
k
(4)
These equations are based on an approximation of uniform distribu-
tion of product strings on the hypercube. On average each producer is
surrounded by Nc
Np
customers which contribute to its capital balance.
We will further observed that this upper bound is seldom reached.
5
4 Simulation results
Most simulations were made for a fixed set of parameters: String
length k = 10, producers cost constant ap = 4.5, number of consumers
(Nc=1000) and initial endowments of producers (Cp = 200) and con-
sumers (Sc = 5). Simulation times were usually 2000, but we checked
that the stationary regime was reached by increasing simulation times
up to 10000.
We studied the influence of consumers constant ac, threshold θ and
Np the initial number of producers.
4.1 Time evolution
Let us first monitor the time evolution of producers capital Ci, of the
average consumer satisfaction S, of the number of consumers death
per time unit and of the surviving number of producers.
On figure 1, where Np initial was 30, Nc = 1000, ap = 1, θ =
.9, we see on the lower right curve that producers are first selected:
there number is decreased from 30 to 11, and then business becomes
profitable (C evolution, on the upper left curves). The early producer
selection gives figures much lower that the upper bound computed
by equation 3 (which should be around 200), but surviving producers
make profit.
Consumers average satisfaction is always lower than 5: since ac = 1
no consumer ever increase satisfaction alive, but the random genera-
tion of reborn consumers allow some of them, ”the condensed” con-
sumers, to reach the cell of one producer where they may survive for
ever. Average S reflects the division between a fraction f of con-
densed consumers with S = 5 and of starving consumers with average
S = 2.5. f then obeys:
f × 5 + (1− f)× 2.5 =< S > (5)
f =
< S > −2.5
2.5
(6)
The increase of < S > towards 5 with time then reflects the increase
of the fraction of ”condensed” consumers towards 1. This effect is
confirmed by decrease of the death rate on the lower left plot.
With ap = 0.9, smaller than one, those condensed consumers in the
neighborhood of the producers can even increase satisfaction during
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Figure 1: Time evolution of producers capital Ci, of the average consumer
satisfaction S, of the number of consumer death per time unit and the number
of surviving producers. Np initial was 30, Nc = 1000, ac = 1, Cp = 200,
θ = .9.
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Figure 2: Time evolution of producers capital Ci, of the average consumer
satisfaction S, of the number of consumer death per time unit and of the
number of surviving producers strings. Np initial was 30,Nc = 1000, θ = .9,
Cp = 200, as on the previous figure but the product cost is now ap = 0.9
instead of 1.
8
their infinite lifetime as observed on the right upper corner. Because
of the lower stress on consumers, they early find spots where they are
able to survive, and they stabilize in the neighborhood of producers
much earlier in time. The diversity of producers is higher: 17 survive.
4.2 Attractors
Let us now do a systematic study of the attractors of the dynamics.
We checked the asymptotic state of the system through a similar set of
variables: producers capital Ci, average consumer satisfaction < S >,
number of surviving producers.
We also tried to characterise the degree of order or of diversity
of the attractor configuration and used the overlap of buyers need
strings as the order function. This is the same notion as used in spin
glass theory. We then checked the fraction h(10)
h(5) of the histogram of
overlaps among buyers need strings. This gives us an indication about
how many consumers are condensed and what is their repartition (even
or uneven) in the neighborhood of producers.
In the next four figures, the horizontal variable is Np the initial
number of producers. The four set of figures correspond to two values
of θ, 09 and 0.8, and ap, 0.9 and 1. These results were averaged over
100 different random samplings of initial configurations.
There is not much to add about the influence ap from these figures.
But the influence of θ on the transition between a competition
regime (θ = .8) and a niche regime (θ = .9) is now made clear.
In the niche regime, θ = .9, few producers survive, even for large
initial number of producers (figure 3). Their number saturates around
20 for higher values of the initial producer number. Producers make
a lot of profit (large C values) (figure 4).
Consumers satisfaction depends upon ac (figure 5).
Significant values of h(1) are observed when ac and θ are both
large.
On figure 6, the large value of the 10 overlap bin observed when
ac = 1 and θ = .9 is an indication that many customers have the same
need string. This concentration of need strings, co-occuring with small
number of surviving producers, is obviously due to their ”condensa-
tion” on producers ”product” strings. Furthermore, the large value
of 0.2 observed for ac = 1 and θ = 0.9 tells us that their distribu-
tion among different producers is uneven; an even distribution would
correspond to the inverse number of surviving producers, 0.05.
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Figure 3: Number of surviving producers. These are taken at time=2000.
Np is varied along the x axis (logarithmic scale). Each of the four plots
correspond to a given pair of ap and θ values, upper plots to a threshold
θ = 0.8 lower plots to a threshold θ = 0.9, left plots to consumption ac = 1
and right plots to consumption ac = 0.9.
10
101 102
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
   θ=0.8 ac=1
<
C>
101 102
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
θ=0.8 ac=0.9
<
C>
101 102
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
θ=0.9 ac=1
<
C>
101 102
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
θ=0.9 ac=.9
<
C>
Figure 4: Averaged producer capital Ci at time=2000. Np is varied along
the x axis (logarithmic scale). Each of the four plots correspond to a given
pair of ap and θ values.
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Figure 5: Average consumer satisfaction S at time=2000. Np is varied along
the x axis (logarithmic scale). Each of the four plots correspond to a given
pair of ac and θ values, upper plots to a threshold θ = 0.8 lower plots to
a threshold θ = 0.9, left plots to consumption ac = 1 and right plots to
consumption ac = 0.9.
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Figure 6: Relative size of the condensed fraction ( h(10)
h(5)
) of consumers at
time=2000. Np is varied along the x axis (logarithmic scale).
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The observation of the time evolution of producer capital, of their
number, and similar observations on consumers clearly demonstrate
two phases of the dynamics at least when ac < 1 and θ is sufficiently
large.
• An initial transient period, during which those customers which
are not close enough to producers die. An equivalent selection
process occurs for producers which are selected against when
customers are not dense enough in their neighborhood to support
them.
• A stationary period, following the selection period. During this
period, customers get enough supply and producer capital in-
crease. Depending upon consumers cost ac, their satisfaction
may increase when ap < 1 or saturate when ac = 1. Depend-
ing upon the threshold for recognition θ, two distinct stationary
regimes are observed:
– A niche regime when customers condensate close to produc-
ers, at lower producer density and higher threshold values.
– A competition regime when producers compete for customers,
at higher producer density and lower threshold values.
4.3 Patterns on the hypercube
Further observations show that the selection process does not give
rise to uniform densities of customers and producers on the hyper-
cube: this process is spatially unstable. When a region is depleted
say in customers, the density of producers is also depleted, and a
further depletion of customers also occurs. As a result the selection
process goes much further in reducing the number of producers that
equation 3 would suggest; surviving producers then make profit and
the histogram of their Hamming distance is biased towards the bins
lower than 5 (which would correspond to a random distribution), as
observed on figure 7. This figure which represent the result of 100 sim-
ulations was taken under severe constraints, ap = 10 and Cp = 1000,
but the number of survivors is much less than the prediction of equa-
tion 3 (100). Producer strings concentrate in a small region of the
hypercube, as observe on the histogram of distances, and by direct
examination of the product strings (not shown here).
The initial dynamics of accumulation of customers in the satisfac-
tion basin of the survivors displayed on figure 8 comfort our hypothe-
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Figure 7: Instability of the producer selection process. The histogram of
the number of surviving producers, the upper diagram, displays a strong
reduction from initial producer number, Np = 100, with large deviations.
The lower histogram displays distances among producer strings, and shows
that they are concentrated in only a small part the hypercube.
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ses. One observes a strong population increase in the satisfaction
basin of the surviving producers and a slow decay in the neighbor-
hood of the opposite strings. The random initial population of any
2-neighbourhood is 56 on average.
The two growth regimes, fast initial increase and slower later in-
crease are understandable: the initial population increase (during
the first 100 time steps) is due to the fact that any site on the 2-
neighbourhood of a surviver has a much longer lifetime than those in
the desert (the desert time life=5). Close to the producers the life
time is infinite at 0 distance, 50 at distance 1, 25 at distance 2. Re-
born consumers (1/5) have a 1000/56 chance to get to an attraction
basin of a surviver, which gives the observed figure of 100 time steps
for the steep increase duration. Later the slow growth correspond to
the replacement of consumers in the attraction basin by those who hit
the surviver site and thus eternity.
5 Conclusions
The present version of the model is evidently very crude with respect
to the more general aspects than one would like to investigate in this
framework. One would like to better understand the dynamics of co-
evolution when producers are endowed with stategic behaviour. This
line of research has already been investigated by [9]. We can predict
from our present study that producers strategies may be influential
and provide higher gains in the competition regime. When the niche
regime is established their efficiency will be extremely limited because
of the condensation of consumers in the neighbourhood of producers.
Other renewal processes can be imagined for consumers such as myopic
learning or reproduction with noise (with probably equivalent results
in the two latter cases).
In other words, the present study has set the stage for more intri-
cate studies in co-evolution.
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Figure 8: Time evolution of producers capital Ci, of the average consumer
satisfaction S, of the number of consumer death per time unit and of the
number of customers in the attraction basin of the two surviving producers
(rising curves) and of two random sites. Np initial was 20,Nc = 1000, ac = 1,
θ = 1. But the value of ap = 10 gives rise to a strong selection of producers.
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